1809 lines
50 KiB
C
1809 lines
50 KiB
C
/*
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* The RSA public-key cryptosystem
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
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* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*
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* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
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*/
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/*
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* The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
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* of the RSA algorithm:
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*
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* [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
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* R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman
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* http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78
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*
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* [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8
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* Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
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*
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*/
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
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#include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"
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#else
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#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
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#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
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#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
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#include "mbedtls/md.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
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#else
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#include <stdio.h>
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#define mbedtls_printf printf
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#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
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#define mbedtls_free free
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#endif
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/*
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* Initialize an RSA context
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*/
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void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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int padding,
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int hash_id)
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{
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
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mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(ctx, padding, hash_id);
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
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mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* Set padding for an existing RSA context
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*/
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void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, int hash_id)
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{
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ctx->padding = padding;
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ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
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/*
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* Generate an RSA keypair
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*/
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int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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void *p_rng,
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unsigned int nbits, int exponent)
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{
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int ret;
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mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, H, G;
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if (f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
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}
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&P1);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&H);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&G);
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/*
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* find primes P and Q with Q < P so that:
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* GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
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*/
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->E, exponent));
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do {
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->P, nbits >> 1, 0,
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f_rng, p_rng));
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if (nbits % 2) {
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->Q, (nbits >> 1) + 1, 0,
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f_rng, p_rng));
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} else {
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, 0,
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f_rng, p_rng));
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}
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if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q) == 0) {
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continue;
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
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if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) != nbits) {
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continue;
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&H, &P1, &Q1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->E, &H));
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} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0);
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/*
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* D = E^-1 mod ((P-1)*(Q-1))
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* DP = D mod (P - 1)
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* DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
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* QP = Q^-1 mod P
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*/
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->D, &ctx->E, &H));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->DP, &ctx->D, &P1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P));
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ctx->len = (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) + 7) >> 3;
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&P1);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&H);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&G);
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if (ret != 0) {
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mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx);
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED + ret);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
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/*
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* Check a public RSA key
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*/
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int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
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{
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if (!ctx->N.p || !ctx->E.p) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED);
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}
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if ((ctx->N.p[0] & 1) == 0 ||
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(ctx->E.p[0] & 1) == 0) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED);
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}
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if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) < 128 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED);
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}
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if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->E) < 2 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->E, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Check a private RSA key
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*/
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int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
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{
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int ret;
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mbedtls_mpi PQ, DE, P1, Q1, H, I, G, G2, L1, L2, DP, DQ, QP;
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if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx)) != 0) {
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return (ret);
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}
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if (!ctx->P.p || !ctx->Q.p || !ctx->D.p) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED);
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}
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&PQ);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&DE);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&P1);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&H);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&I);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&G);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&G2);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&L1);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&L2);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&QP);
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&PQ, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DE, &ctx->D, &ctx->E));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&H, &P1, &Q1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->E, &H));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G2, &P1, &Q1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&L1, &L2, &H, &G2));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&I, &DE, &L1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&DP, &ctx->D, &P1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P));
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/*
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* Check for a valid PKCS1v2 private key
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*/
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if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&PQ, &ctx->N) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&DP, &ctx->DP) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&DQ, &ctx->DQ) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&QP, &ctx->QP) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L2, 0) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&I, 1) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0) {
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
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}
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&PQ);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&DE);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&P1);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&H);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&I);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&G);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&G2);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&L1);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&L2);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ);
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&QP);
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if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) {
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return (ret);
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}
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if (ret != 0) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + ret);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Check if contexts holding a public and private key match
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*/
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int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv)
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{
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if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED);
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}
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if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->N, &prv->N) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->E, &prv->E) != 0) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Do an RSA public key operation
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*/
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int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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const unsigned char *input,
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unsigned char *output)
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{
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int ret;
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size_t olen;
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mbedtls_mpi T;
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
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if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
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return (ret);
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}
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#endif
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
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if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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olen = ctx->len;
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
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cleanup:
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
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if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR);
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}
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#endif
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
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if (ret != 0) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of:
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* KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
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* DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
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* Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
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*/
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static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
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{
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int ret, count = 0;
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if (ctx->Vf.p != NULL) {
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/* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
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goto cleanup;
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}
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/* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
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do {
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if (count++ > 10) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED);
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
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} while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Vi, 1) != 0);
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/* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N */
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
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|
|
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cleanup:
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return (ret);
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}
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|
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/*
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* Do an RSA private key operation
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*/
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int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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void *p_rng,
|
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const unsigned char *input,
|
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unsigned char *output)
|
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{
|
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int ret;
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size_t olen;
|
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mbedtls_mpi T, T1, T2;
|
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|
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/* Make sure we have private key info, prevent possible misuse */
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if (ctx->P.p == NULL || ctx->Q.p == NULL || ctx->D.p == NULL) {
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return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
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}
|
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|
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&T1);
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&T2);
|
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|
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
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if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
|
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return (ret);
|
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}
|
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#endif
|
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|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
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if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
|
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
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goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
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if (f_rng != NULL) {
|
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/*
|
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* Blinding
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* T = T * Vi mod N
|
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*/
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng));
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi));
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
|
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}
|
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|
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
|
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#else
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/*
|
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* faster decryption using the CRT
|
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*
|
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* T1 = input ^ dP mod P
|
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* T2 = input ^ dQ mod Q
|
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*/
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T1, &T, &ctx->DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T2, &T, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ));
|
|
|
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/*
|
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* T = (T1 - T2) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
|
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*/
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&T, &T1, &T2));
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T1, &T, &ctx->QP));
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T1, &ctx->P));
|
|
|
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/*
|
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* T = T2 + T * Q
|
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*/
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T1, &T, &ctx->Q));
|
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &T2, &T1));
|
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
|
|
|
|
if (f_rng != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unblind
|
|
* T = T * Vf mod N
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vf));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
|
if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T1);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T2);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
|
|
*
|
|
* \param dst buffer to mask
|
|
* \param dlen length of destination buffer
|
|
* \param src source of the mask generation
|
|
* \param slen length of the source buffer
|
|
* \param md_ctx message digest context to use
|
|
*/
|
|
static void mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src,
|
|
size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char counter[4];
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
|
size_t i, use_len;
|
|
|
|
memset(mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE);
|
|
memset(counter, 0, 4);
|
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info);
|
|
|
|
// Generate and apply dbMask
|
|
//
|
|
p = dst;
|
|
|
|
while (dlen > 0) {
|
|
use_len = hlen;
|
|
if (dlen < hlen) {
|
|
use_len = dlen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, src, slen);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, counter, 4);
|
|
mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, mask);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < use_len; ++i) {
|
|
*p++ ^= mask[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
counter[3]++;
|
|
|
|
dlen -= use_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
|
|
size_t ilen,
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t olen;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
unsigned char *p = output;
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
|
|
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (f_rng == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
|
|
if (olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(output, 0, olen);
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Generate a random octet string seed
|
|
//
|
|
if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, hlen)) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
|
|
// Construct DB
|
|
//
|
|
mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, p);
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
|
|
*p++ = 1;
|
|
memcpy(p, input, ilen);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0);
|
|
|
|
// maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
|
|
//
|
|
mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
|
|
&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
// maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed
|
|
//
|
|
mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
|
|
&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
return ((mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC)
|
|
? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output)
|
|
: mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode, size_t ilen,
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t nb_pad, olen;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
unsigned char *p = output;
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We don't check p_rng because it won't be dereferenced here
|
|
if (f_rng == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
if (olen < ilen + 11) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) {
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
|
|
|
|
while (nb_pad-- > 0) {
|
|
int rng_dl = 100;
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1);
|
|
} while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0);
|
|
|
|
// Check if RNG failed to generate data
|
|
//
|
|
if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
while (nb_pad-- > 0) {
|
|
*p++ = 0xFF;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
memcpy(p, input, ilen);
|
|
|
|
return ((mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC)
|
|
? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output)
|
|
: mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode, size_t ilen,
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
unsigned char *output)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen,
|
|
input, output);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
|
|
ilen, input, output);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
|
|
size_t *olen,
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
unsigned char *output,
|
|
size_t output_max_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
|
|
unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done;
|
|
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
|
|
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Parameters sanity checks
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ilen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RSA operation
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC)
|
|
? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf)
|
|
: mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unmask data and generate lHash
|
|
*/
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Generate lHash */
|
|
mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, lhash);
|
|
|
|
/* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
|
|
mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
|
|
&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
|
|
mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
|
|
&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check contents, in "constant-time"
|
|
*/
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
bad = 0;
|
|
|
|
bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
|
|
|
|
p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
|
|
|
|
/* Check lHash */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < hlen; i++) {
|
|
bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
|
|
* (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
|
|
pad_len = 0;
|
|
pad_done = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) {
|
|
pad_done |= p[i];
|
|
pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) - pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += pad_len;
|
|
bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not
|
|
* (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the
|
|
* recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
|
|
* the different error conditions.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (bad != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
|
|
memcpy(output, p, *olen);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode, size_t *olen,
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
unsigned char *output,
|
|
size_t output_max_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t ilen, pad_count = 0, i;
|
|
unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done = 0;
|
|
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ilen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC)
|
|
? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf)
|
|
: mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
bad = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check and get padding len in "constant-time"
|
|
*/
|
|
bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
|
|
|
|
/* This test does not depend on secret data */
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE) {
|
|
bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
|
|
|
|
/* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
|
|
* (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++) {
|
|
pad_done |= ((p[i] | (unsigned char) - p[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
|
|
pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) - pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += pad_count;
|
|
bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
|
|
} else {
|
|
bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
/* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
|
|
* (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++) {
|
|
pad_done |= (p[i] != 0xFF);
|
|
pad_count += (pad_done == 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += pad_count;
|
|
bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bad) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
|
|
memcpy(output, p, *olen);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode, size_t *olen,
|
|
const unsigned char *input,
|
|
unsigned char *output,
|
|
size_t output_max_len)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen,
|
|
input, output, output_max_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
|
|
olen, input, output,
|
|
output_max_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t olen;
|
|
unsigned char *p = sig;
|
|
unsigned char salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t msb;
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
|
|
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (f_rng == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
|
// Gather length of hash to sign
|
|
//
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
slen = hlen;
|
|
|
|
if (olen < hlen + slen + 2) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(sig, 0, olen);
|
|
|
|
// Generate salt of length slen
|
|
//
|
|
if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, salt, slen)) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits
|
|
//
|
|
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
|
|
p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
|
|
*p++ = 0x01;
|
|
memcpy(p, salt, slen);
|
|
p += slen;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0);
|
|
|
|
// Generate H = Hash( M' )
|
|
//
|
|
mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, 8);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen);
|
|
mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, p);
|
|
|
|
// Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
|
|
//
|
|
if (msb % 8 == 0) {
|
|
offset = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
|
|
//
|
|
mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, &md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
|
|
sig[0] &= 0xFF >> (olen * 8 - msb);
|
|
|
|
p += hlen;
|
|
*p++ = 0xBC;
|
|
|
|
return ((mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC)
|
|
? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig)
|
|
: mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *p = sig;
|
|
const char *oid = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
unsigned char diff;
|
|
volatile unsigned char diff_no_optimize;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
olen = ctx->len;
|
|
nb_pad = olen - 3;
|
|
|
|
if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nb_pad -= 10 + oid_size;
|
|
|
|
hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nb_pad -= hashlen;
|
|
|
|
if ((nb_pad < 8) || (nb_pad > olen)) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
memset(p, 0xFF, nb_pad);
|
|
p += nb_pad;
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
|
memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
* digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
|
|
* digest Digest }
|
|
*
|
|
* DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
|
|
*
|
|
* Digest ::= OCTET STRING
|
|
*/
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)(0x08 + oid_size + hashlen);
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)(0x04 + oid_size);
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
|
|
*p++ = oid_size & 0xFF;
|
|
memcpy(p, oid, oid_size);
|
|
p += oid_size;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL;
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
|
|
*p++ = hashlen;
|
|
memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) {
|
|
return (mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
|
|
* temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
|
|
*/
|
|
sig_try = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
|
|
if (sig_try == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verif = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
|
|
if (verif == NULL) {
|
|
mbedtls_free(sig_try);
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig_try, verif));
|
|
|
|
/* Compare in constant time just in case */
|
|
for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < ctx->len; i++) {
|
|
diff |= verif[i] ^ sig[i];
|
|
}
|
|
diff_no_optimize = diff;
|
|
|
|
if (diff_no_optimize != 0) {
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len);
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
mbedtls_free(sig_try);
|
|
mbedtls_free(verif);
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
unsigned char *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
|
|
hashlen, hash, sig);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
|
|
hashlen, hash, sig);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
|
|
int expected_salt_len,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t siglen;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char zeros[8];
|
|
unsigned int hlen;
|
|
size_t slen, msb;
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
|
|
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
siglen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
if (siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC)
|
|
? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf)
|
|
: mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
|
|
if (buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
|
// Gather length of hash to sign
|
|
//
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mgf1_hash_id);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
slen = siglen - hlen - 1; /* Currently length of salt + padding */
|
|
|
|
memset(zeros, 0, 8);
|
|
|
|
// Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
|
|
//
|
|
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
|
|
|
|
// Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
|
|
//
|
|
if (msb % 8 == 0) {
|
|
p++;
|
|
siglen -= 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (buf[0] >> (8 - siglen * 8 + msb)) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0);
|
|
|
|
mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb);
|
|
|
|
while (p < buf + siglen && *p == 0) {
|
|
p++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p == buf + siglen ||
|
|
*p++ != 0x01) {
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Actual salt len */
|
|
slen -= p - buf;
|
|
|
|
if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
|
|
slen != (size_t) expected_salt_len) {
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate H = Hash( M' )
|
|
//
|
|
mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, 8);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen);
|
|
mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, slen);
|
|
mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, result);
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(p + slen, result, hlen) == 0) {
|
|
return (0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)
|
|
? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
|
|
: md_alg;
|
|
|
|
return (mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode,
|
|
md_alg, hashlen, hash,
|
|
mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
|
|
sig));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t len, siglen, asn1_len;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *end;
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t msg_md_alg;
|
|
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
|
|
mbedtls_asn1_buf oid;
|
|
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
siglen = ctx->len;
|
|
|
|
if (siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC)
|
|
? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf)
|
|
: mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
|
|
if (*p++ != 0 || *p++ != MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (*p != 0) {
|
|
if (p >= buf + siglen - 1 || *p != 0xFF) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
p++;
|
|
}
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
len = siglen - (p - buf);
|
|
|
|
if (len == hashlen && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
|
|
if (memcmp(p, hash, hashlen) == 0) {
|
|
return (0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
|
|
if (md_info == NULL) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
|
|
|
|
end = p + len;
|
|
|
|
// Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure
|
|
//
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &asn1_len,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (asn1_len + 2 != len) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &asn1_len,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oid.p = p;
|
|
p += oid.len;
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&oid, &msg_md_alg) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (md_alg != msg_md_alg) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* assume the algorithm parameters must be NULL
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL)) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (asn1_len != hashlen) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(p, hash, hashlen) != 0) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += hashlen;
|
|
|
|
if (p != end) {
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
|
|
void *p_rng,
|
|
int mode,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
unsigned int hashlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ctx->padding) {
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
|
|
hashlen, hash, sig);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
|
|
return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
|
|
hashlen, hash, sig);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return (MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the components of an RSA key
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
dst->ver = src->ver;
|
|
dst->len = src->len;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->N, &src->N));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->E, &src->E));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->D, &src->D));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->P, &src->P));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Q, &src->Q));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DP, &src->DP));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DQ, &src->DQ));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->QP, &src->QP));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RN, &src->RN));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RP, &src->RP));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RQ, &src->RQ));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vi, &src->Vi));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vf, &src->Vf));
|
|
|
|
dst->padding = src->padding;
|
|
dst->hash_id = src->hash_id;
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
if (ret != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_free(dst);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Free the components of an RSA key
|
|
*/
|
|
void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RQ);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RN);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->QP);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DQ);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DP);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Q);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->D);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->E);
|
|
mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->N);
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
|
|
mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
|
|
|
|
#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
|
|
*/
|
|
#define KEY_LEN 128
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
|
|
"8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
|
|
"DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
|
|
"7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
|
|
"93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
|
|
"1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
|
|
"EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
|
|
"5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_E "10001"
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
|
|
"66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
|
|
"91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
|
|
"AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
|
|
"DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
|
|
"CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
|
|
"AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
|
|
"071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
|
|
"2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
|
|
"FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
|
|
"C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
|
|
"E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
|
|
"910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
|
|
"8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_DP "C1ACF567564274FB07A0BBAD5D26E298" \
|
|
"3C94D22288ACD763FD8E5600ED4A702D" \
|
|
"F84198A5F06C2E72236AE490C93F07F8" \
|
|
"3CC559CD27BC2D1CA488811730BB5725"
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_DQ "4959CBF6F8FEF750AEE6977C155579C7" \
|
|
"D8AAEA56749EA28623272E4F7D0592AF" \
|
|
"7C1F1313CAC9471B5C523BFE592F517B" \
|
|
"407A1BD76C164B93DA2D32A383E58357"
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_QP "9AE7FBC99546432DF71896FC239EADAE" \
|
|
"F38D18D2B2F0E2DD275AA977E2BF4411" \
|
|
"F5A3B2A5D33605AEBBCCBA7FEB9F2D2F" \
|
|
"A74206CEC169D74BF5A8C50D6F48EA08"
|
|
|
|
#define PT_LEN 24
|
|
#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
|
|
"\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
static int myrand(void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
#if !defined(__OpenBSD__)
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (rng_state != NULL) {
|
|
rng_state = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
|
|
output[i] = rand();
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
if (rng_state != NULL) {
|
|
rng_state = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arc4random_buf(output, len);
|
|
#endif /* !OpenBSD */
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Checkup routine
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
|
|
unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
|
|
unsigned char sha1sum[20];
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0);
|
|
|
|
rsa.len = KEY_LEN;
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.N, 16, RSA_N));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.E, 16, RSA_E));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.D, 16, RSA_D));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.P, 16, RSA_P));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.Q, 16, RSA_Q));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.DP, 16, RSA_DP));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.DQ, 16, RSA_DQ));
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&rsa.QP, 16, RSA_QP));
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf(" RSA key validation: ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&rsa) != 0 ||
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&rsa) != 0) {
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, PT_LEN,
|
|
rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, &len,
|
|
rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
|
|
sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) {
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len) != 0) {
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf(" PKCS#1 data sign : ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_sha1(rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum);
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0,
|
|
sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0,
|
|
sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
|
|
|
|
if (verbose != 0) {
|
|
mbedtls_printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
|
|
#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
|
((void) verbose);
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
|